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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA,
RICHMOND DIVISION
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA, )
ex rel. Kenneth T. Cuccinelli, II, in his official )
capacity as Attorney General of Virginia, )
)
Plaintiff, )
) Civil Action No. 3:10-cv-00188-HEH
v. )
)
KATHLEEN SEBELIUS, Secretary of the )
Department of Health and Human Services, )
in her official capacity, )
)
Defendant. )
______________________________________ )
AMICUS CURIAE BRIEF OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW PROFESSORS
IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS
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1INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE
Amici are professors of law who teach and write about constitutional law. They
have substantial expertise in the text, history, and structure of the Constitution as well as
constitutional law doctrine as developed by the Supreme Court, including as it relates to
the legislative authority of the federal government. Their legal expertise thus bears
directly on the constitutional issues before the Court in this case. In cases presenting
constitutional issues such as those before this Court, it is common for courts to accept
amicus briefs from legal academics with relevant expertise.
Amici include (institutional affiliations listed for identification purposes only):
 Jack M. Balkin, Knight Professor of Constitutional Law and the First
Amendment, Yale Law School
 Gillian E. Metzger, Professor of Law, Columbia Law School
 Trevor W. Morrison, Professor of Law, Columbia Law School
INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The recently enacted Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (“ACA”), Pub. L.
No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010), is landmark federal legislation dramatically
expanding nationwide access to health insurance and health care. Among its many
interrelated reforms, the ACA creates new health benefits exchanges, expands Medicaid,
provides tax credits and other incentives to subsidize the purchase of health insurance,
prohibits certain coverage exclusions such as discrimination based on pre-existing
conditions, and requires many employers to provide insurance. In the provision
challenged in this litigation, the ACA also generally requires individuals to obtain health
insurance. See id. §§ 1501(b), 10106, amended by Pub. L. No. 111-152 §1002, 124 Stat.
1029, 1032 (2010). This Minimum Coverage Fee Provision mandates (subject to several
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2exemptions, including lack of income and inability to pay) that individuals either
purchase a minimally adequate health insurance plan for themselves and their families or
pay an annual penalty, calculated as a percentage of their income and subject to upper
and lower caps. The Minimum Coverage Fee Provision is a key component in the ACA’s
comprehensive statutory scheme, and plays an essential role in reducing the cost of health
insurance for all Americans.
Amici have no doubt that the Minimum Coverage Fee Provision is a permissible
exercise of Congress’s power under the Interstate Commerce Clause, U.S. Const. art. I, §
8, cl. 3, and anticipate that Defendant will present ample arguments on those grounds.
But the Minimum Coverage Fee Provision also falls well within the Constitution’s grant
to Congress of an extensive and comprehensive “Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties,
Imposts and Excises.” Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. As the jurisprudence and constitutional history
underlying this Clause are generally less familiar than that relating to the Commerce
Clause, Amici confine themselves here to explaining the constitutionality of the
Minimum Coverage Fee Provision on this alternative ground.
Congress’s taxing power is exceedingly broad. The Supreme Court has
repeatedly reaffirmed the taxing power’s reach, and held that a tax is valid if it serves the
general welfare, is reasonably related to revenue raising and does not violate any
independent constitutional prohibition. The Court has specifically and repeatedly
affirmed that the taxing power is not limited to subjects within Congress’s other
enumerated powers and that a tax is not invalid simply because it has a regulatory
purpose or effect. The Minimum Coverage Fee Provision plainly satisfies the standard
for legitimate exercises of the taxing power.
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3The Constitution does impose one express limit1 on the taxing power: it states
that ”No Capitation, or other direct, Tax, shall be laid, unless in Proportion to the Census
or Enumeration herein before directed to be taken,” U.S. Const. art. I, §9, cl. 4. That
limitation is not applicable here, because the Supreme Court has long restricted the set of
taxes subject to the Direct Tax Clause to taxes upon real property, taxes upon personal
property, and capitation taxes (which are imposed on a per-person basis without regard to
property, income or other circumstance). Because the Minimum Coverage Fee Provision
is not one of these taxes, it is not governed by the Direct Tax Clause.
ARGUMENT
I. The Minimum Coverage Fee Provision Is A Permissible Exercise Of
Congress’s Taxing Power.
The Constitution’s grant of taxing authority is strikingly broad. Congress has
“Power to lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts, and Excises, to pay the Debts and
provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States.” U.S. Const.
art. I., § 8, cl. 1. “More comprehensive words could not have been used.” Veazie Bank v.
Fenno, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 533, 540 (1869).2
A. The Taxing Power Constitutes A Broad And Independent Grant Of
Authority To Congress.
The breadth of the Constitution’s grant of taxing power is no accident. A
fundamental problem under the pre-existing Articles of Confederation was that the
1 A second constitutional limit on the taxing power—the requirement that “all Duties,
Imposts and Excises shall be uniform throughout the United States,” U.S. Const. art. I., §
8, cl. 1—is not implicated here.
2 Only one subject—exports—is removed from the otherwise plenary scope of
Congress’s taxing authority. See U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 5 (“No Tax or Duty shall be
laid on Articles exported from any State.”). Nothing about that exclusion is implicated in
this case.
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4Continental Congress had no power to tax individuals directly. Instead, the Congress
would send the states “requisitions” for funds with the amount per state set “in proportion
to the value of all land within each State.” Articles of Confed. art. VIII (1781). It was
then up to the states to levy and collect taxes to provide the requisitioned amount within
the time stipulated. States often failed to do so, and Congress had few means by which to
force them to comply. See generally Roger H. Brown, Redeeming the Republic:
Federalists, Taxation, and the Origins of the Constitution (1993) (detailing the breakdown
of requisitions).
The failure of the requisitions system, which ultimately “reduced the United
States to bankruptcy[,] * * * demonstrated the need of a central government that should
possess the power of taxation.” Charles J. Bullock, The Origin, Purpose and Effect of the
Direct-Tax Clause of the Federal Constitution I, 15 Pol. Sci. Q. 217, 218 (1900).
Creating a federal government with a more robust taxing power and adequate revenue for
that reason became a major goal behind adoption of the Constitution. See Cohens v.
Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 388 (1821); see also The Federalist No. 30 (Alexander
Hamilton) in The Federalist Papers 188-90 (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961); Brown, supra, at
3-8. As the Supreme Court has explained, “nothing is clearer, from the discussions in the
Convention and the discussions which preceded final ratification by the necessary
number of States, than the purpose to give this power to Congress, as to the taxation of
everything except exports, in its fullest extent.” Veazie Bank, 75 U.S. at 540.
Based on the Constitution’s broad language, and this clear history, the Supreme
Court has upheld measures as valid exercises of the taxing power so long as they serve
the general welfare, raise revenue, and do not violate any independent constitutional
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5prohibition. And the Court has squarely rejected arguments that the taxing power is
limited to subjects that Congress can reach under the Commerce Clause or other grants of
authority, as well as claims that a regulatory purpose or effect renders a tax invalid.
1. Congress’s exercise of its taxing power is valid as long as the
tax serves the general welfare, is reasonably related to revenue
raising, and does not violate a constitutional limitation on
Congress’s authority.
The Court has long emphasized the wide scope of Congress’s taxing power,
describing it as ”extensive,” License Tax Cases, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 462, 471 (1867),
“exhaustive,” Brushaber v. Union Pac. R.R., 240 U.S. 1, 12 (1916), and “virtually
without limitation,” United States v. Ptasynski, 462 U.S. 74, 79 (1983). “As is well
known, the constitutional restraints on taxing are few. * * * The remedy for excessive
taxation is in the hands of Congress, not the courts.” United States v. Kahriger, 345 U.S.
22, 28 (1953), overruled in part on other grounds, Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S.
39 (1968); see also Veazie Bank, 75 U.S. at 548 (“The power to tax may be exercised
oppressively upon persons, but the responsibility of the legislature is not to the courts, but
to the people by whom its members are elected.”).
Despite its breadth, the scope of the taxing power is not unlimited. The Court has
identified three tests that a valid tax must satisfy.
The first constraint is evident from the text of the Constitution: To be valid, a tax
measure must seek to “pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and general
Welfare.” U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 1; 1 Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution
of the United States 663 (Melville M. Bigelow ed., 5th ed. 1891). Congress enjoys wide
discretion to determine whether a tax measure serves the general welfare. Helvering v.
Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 641 (1937); see also South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207
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6(1987); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 90-91 (1976). But that the general welfare
constraint on the tax power is enforced primarily through the political process does not
make the requirement any less real. See Kahriger, 345 U.S. at 28; McCray v. United
States, 195 U.S. 27, 55-56 (1904).
Second, to fall within the tax power a measure must bear “some reasonable
relation” to the “raising of revenue,” United States v. Doremus, 249 U.S. 86, 93-94
(1919), even if the revenue actually produced is “negligible,” United States v. Sanchez,
340 U.S. 42, 44 (1950). Accord Kahriger, 345 U.S. at 28 (noting tax at issue “produces
revenue”); Sonzinsky v. United States, 300 U.S. 506, 514 (1937) (sustaining tax
“productive of some revenue”); Hampton v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 412 (1928)
(requiring only a “motive * * * [and] effect * * * to secure revenue”); see also Nigro v.
United States, 276 U.S. 332, 353 (1928) (concluding any “doubt as to the character” of a
tax measure was removed when “what was a nominal tax before was made a substantial
one”).
Third, the Court has also rejected tax measures that violate independent
constitutional prohibitions, such as the Fifth Amendment’s prohibition on double
jeopardy. Dep’t of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. 767, 778-79, 784 (1994); accord
Marchetti, 390 U.S. at 50-52 (invalidating wagering tax as violating Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination).
2. The Supreme Court has rejected other limitations on the
taxing power.
The Court has squarely and repeatedly rejected arguments that Congress’s taxing
authority is limited by the scope of its other enumerated powers. Moreover, Congress
does not exceed its broad taxing power simply because a particular tax has regulatory
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7purpose or effects.
a. Congress may tax activities not subject to regulation
under Congress’s other enumerated powers.
“[T]he Constitution, art. 1, § 8, cl. 1, delegates a power separate and distinct from
those later enumerated, and one not restricted by them.” United States v. Gerlach Live
Stock Co., 339 U.S. 725, 738 (1950). The Supreme Court confirmed the independent
status of the taxing power early in the Nation’s history, in its 1867 decision in the License
Tax Cases, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 462 (1867). There, the Court sustained a congressional
statute requiring purchase of a license before engaging in certain trades and businesses,
including selling lottery tickets or liquor. It noted that “Congress has no power of
regulation nor any direct control” over “the internal commerce or domestic trade of the
States,” yet nonetheless upheld the measure under the tax power. Id. at 470-71; see
Sanchez, 340 U.S. at 44 (“Nor does a tax statute necessarily fail because it touches on
activities which Congress might not otherwise regulate.”) .
This recognition that Congress may tax activities that fall beyond its regulatory
authority accords with the Court’s approach to the spending power, a power derived from
the very same clause of Article I. See Dole, 483 U.S. at 206. In Dole, the Court
expressly stated that the spending power extends to “objectives not thought to be within
Article I’s enumerated legislative fields.” Id. at 207 (internal quotations omitted). Given
their grounding in the same portion of the Constitution’s text, it would be anomalous to
say the least if the taxing power did not similarly extend beyond Congress’s enumerated
areas of regulatory authority.
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8b. A regulatory purpose or effect does not disqualify a
measure under the tax power.
The Court also has made clear that the fact that a tax has a regulatory purpose or
effect does not remove a measure from the scope of the tax power. “Every tax is in some
measure regulatory. * * * But a tax is not any less a tax because it has a regulatory
effect.” Sonzinsky, 300 U.S. at 513. The Court made the point even more forcefully in
its subsequent decision in Sanchez, insisting that “[i]t is beyond serious question that a
tax does not cease to be valid merely because it regulates, discourages, or even definitely
deters the activities taxed.” 340 U.S. at 44; see also Kahriger, 345 U.S. at 27 (noting
numerous instances in which the Court upheld taxes notwithstanding a manifest “intent to
curtail and hinder, as well as tax”); Minor v. United States, 396 U.S. 87, 98 n.13 (1969)
(“A statute does not cease to be a valid tax measure because it deters the activity taxed,
because the revenue obtained is negligible, or because the activity is otherwise illegal.”);
United States v. One Ford Coupe Auto., 272 U.S. 321, 328 (1926) (“A tax on intoxicating
liquor does not cease to be such because the sovereign has declared that none shall be
manufactured, and because the main purpose in retaining the tax is to make lawbreaking
less profitable.”).
“[F]rom an early day the court has held that the fact that other motives may impel
the exercise of federal taxing power does not authorize courts to inquire into that
subject.” Doremus, 249 U.S. at 93. As long as “the legislation enacted has some
reasonable relation to the exercise of the taxing authority conferred by the Constitution, it
cannot be invalidated because of the supposed motives which induced it.” Id.; Sonzinsky,
300 U.S. at 513-14 (“Inquiry into the hidden motives which may move (a legislature) to
exercise a power constitutionally conferred upon it is beyond the competency of courts.”);
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9A Magnano Co. v. Hamilton, 292 U.S. 40, 44 (1934) (“Collateral purposes or motives of
a Legislature in levying a tax of a kind within reach of its lawful power are matters
beyond the scope of judicial inquiry.”); McCray, 195 U.S. at 59 (insisting that the
“motive or purpose of Congress in adopting the [tax] acts in question may not be inquired
into”); United States v. Aiken, 974 F.2d 446, 448 (4th Cir. 1992) (upholding
constitutionality of National Firearms Act against claim that it was an impermissible
regulation on the ground that the Act’s regulatory provisions “need only bear a
‘reasonable relation’ to the statute's taxing purpose”); United States v. Spoerke, 568 F.3d
1236, 1245-46 (11th Cir. 2009) (upholding National Firearms Act as permissible exercise
of the taxing power even though Act had regulatory effect and revenue raised was
negligible); Zwak v. United States, 848 F.2d 1179, 1182-83 (11th Cir. 1988) (relying on
Sonzinsky and Kahriger to sustain National Firearms Act against claim that it was
unconstitutionally punitive); United States v. Ross, 458 F.2d 1144, 1145 (5th Cir. 1972)
(rejecting constitutional challenge to National Firearms Act based on alleged confiscatory
nature of tax: “every tax is regulatory to some extent. The test of validity is whether on its
face the tax operates as a revenue generating measure and the attendant regulations are in
aid of a revenue purpose”).
To be sure, during the 1920s and 1930s, the Supreme Court did invalidate some
federal taxes on the ground that they had been adopted primarily to enforce compliance
with a regulatory program that fell outside of Congress’s enumerated powers under the
then-prevailing interpretation of the Commerce Clause. See, e.g., United States v. Butler,
297 U.S. 1, 58-59 (1936); United States v. Constantine, 296 U.S. 287, 295 (1935); Hill v.
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Wallace, 259 U.S. 44, 66-68 (1922); Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co. (Child Labor Tax
Case), 259 U.S. 20, 37-38 (1922).
For example, the tax on goods manufactured using child labor at issue in Bailey
was enacted after the Court held that Congress could not regulate child labor under its
commerce power. See Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 276-77 (1918). Congress
adopted a virtually identical set of restrictions on the use of child labor and “provide[] a
heavy exaction for a departure from [that] detailed and specified course of conduct.”
Bailey, 259 U.S. at 36. The Court’s decision holding the measure beyond Congress’s
Taxing Power rested completely on the fact that the tax was being used to impose an
entire regulatory program that was beyond Congress’s power under the Commerce
Clause:
Grant the validity of this law, and all that Congress would need to do,
hereafter, in seeking to take over to its control any one of the great number
of subjects of public interest, jurisdiction of which the states have never
parted with, and which are reserved to them by the Tenth Amendment,
would be to enact a detailed measure of complete regulation of the subject
and enforce it by a so-called tax upon departures from it. To give such
magic to the word “tax” would be to break down all constitutional
limitation of the powers of Congress and completely wipe out the
sovereignty of the states.
Id. at 38. The other decisions from this period rested on the same rationale. See Butler,
297 U.S. at 59 (“The tax plays an indispensable part in the plan of regulation * * * [and]
by its operation shows the exaction laid upon processors to be the necessary means for
the intended control of agricultural production.”); Constantine, 296 U.S. at 296 (“[I]n the
present instance, under the guise of a taxing act the purpose is to usurp the police powers
of the state.”); Hill, 259 U.S. at 68-69 (“Congress sought to use the taxing power to give
validity to the act. It did not have the exercise of its power under the commerce clause in
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mind, and so did not introduce into the act the limitations which certainly would
accompany and mark an exercise of the power under the latter clause.”).
Although these decisions have not been explicitly overruled, their continued
validity is doubtful. To begin with, they are products of the Lochner era, the heyday of
the Supreme Court’s hostility to economic regulation, including a highly restrictive view
of Congress’s commerce and spending powers. Those doctrines have been repudiated.
Indeed, in rejecting the narrow view of the Commerce Clause, the Court expressly
overruled Hammer and holding that “[t]he motive and purpose of a regulation of
interstate commerce are matters of legislative judgment upon the exercise of which the
Constitution places no restriction.” United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 115-16 (1941)
(citing the tax power decisions of McCray, Sonzinsky, and Veazie Bank in support); see
Kahriger, 345 U.S. at 29-31 & n.6 (noting Darby’s reversal of Hammer and stating it is
“hard to understand why the power to tax should raise more doubts because of indirect
effects than other federal powers”); cf. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 158
(1992) (stating that “[a]s conventional notions of the proper objects of government
spending have changed over the years, so has the ability of Congress to ‘fix the terms on
which it shall disburse federal money to the States’” and citing the contrast between Dole
and Butler as an example).
The Supreme Court itself has discredited these decisions, noting that it had
abandoned its earlier “distinctions between regulatory and revenue-raising taxes.” Bob
Jones Univ. v. Simon, 416 U.S. 725, 741 n.12 (1974). Sanchez expressly rejects the
earlier decisions’ suggestion that a regulatory purpose is only acceptable if “incidental,”
Bailey, 259 U.S. at 38, insisting instead that a tax remains valid “even though * * * the
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revenue purpose of the tax may be secondary.” Sanchez, 340 U.S. at 44; cf. City of
Pittsburgh v. Alco Parking Corp., 417 U.S. 369, 375 (1974) (“[E]ven if the revenue
collected had been insubstantial, or the revenue purpose only secondary, we would not
necessarily treat this exaction as anything but a tax * * *”) (internal citations omitted).
Today, any scrutiny the Court devotes to the purposes underlying a tax measure
focuses on ensuring it is not a criminal imposition in disguise. See Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S.
at 779-83 (concluding that tax on drugs constituted criminal punishment and therefore
violated the Double Jeopardy Clause).
To the extent the Lochner era precedents remain valid, the Court might also
conceivably invalidate as pretextual a levy so high as to amount to a coercive penalty that
is being used to compel compliance with an entire regulatory scheme that falls wholly
outside Congress’s authority under the Court’s precedents. That is the situation its
Lochner era precedents addressed, and that is how the Court has interpreted them since
then. Kahriger, 345 U.S. at 31 (“Penalty provisions in tax statutes added for breach of a
regulation concerning activities in themselves subject only to state regulation have caused
this Court to declare the enactments invalid.”) (citing Bailey and similar decisions).
Absent such extreme circumstances, however, even the Lochner era decisions do not
license judicial second guessing of Congress’s intentions in enacting what appears “on its
face” to be a valid tax. See Sonzinsky, 300 U.S. at 513. “Inquiry into the hidden motives
which may move (a legislature) to exercise a power constitutionally conferred upon it is
beyond the competency of courts.” Id. at 513-14.
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B. The Minimum Coverage Fee Provision Is A Valid Exercise Of The
Tax Power.
The Minimum Coverage Fee Provision easily satisfies the requirements for a
valid tax.
First, in determining whether a congressional enactment furthers the general
welfare, “courts should defer substantially to the judgment of Congress.” Dole, 483 U.S.
at 207. Providing uncompensated care to the uninsured cost $43 billion in 2008—a cost
that was passed on to private insurers, see Pub. L. No. 111-148, §§ 1501(a)(2)(F),
10106(a), and substantially subsidized by the government, see Jack Hadley et al.,
Covering the Uninsured in 2008: Current Costs, Sources of Payment, and Incremental
Costs, Health Affairs W403-W406 (Aug. 25, 2008), cited in H.R. Rep. No. 111-443, pt. 2,
111th Cong., 2d Sess., at 983 (2010). Healthy individuals’ failure to purchase insurance
leads to increased premium rates for those who do purchase insurance—and some aspects
of the ACA, such as the ban on denying coverage based on preexisting conditions, see
Pub. L. No. 111-148, §§ 1501(a)(2), 10106(a)(I), could increase healthy individuals’
incentives not to obtain insurance.
By encouraging individuals to purchase health insurance, the Minimum Coverage
Fee Provision alleviates these and other costs and lowers health insurance premiums. See
id. Pub. L. No. 111-148, §§ 1501(a)(2)(C), (G), 10106(I), (J). Such cost reductions and
expansions in access to health insurance surely constitute contributions to the general
welfare.
Second, it is also clear that the provision constitutes a genuine revenue-raising
device. Although Congress itself did not make findings of the provision’s revenue-
raising impact, the Congressional Budget Office estimated that it would produce
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approximately $4 billion annually by 2017. See Letter from Douglas W. Elmendorf,
Director, Cong. Budget Office, to the Honorable Nancy Pelosi, Speaker, U.S. House of
Representatives (Mar. 18, 2010), at tbl.4 at 2. Over the course of the period 2010-2019,
the provision will generate approximately $17 billion in revenue. See id. No more is
needed to satisfy the revenue requirement. See Sonzinsky, 300 U.S. at 514 n.1 (upholding
tax that raised $5400 in revenue in 1934—$88,000 in today’s dollars).
Moreover, the provision “on its face purports to be an exercise of the taxing
power.” Sonzinsky, 300 U.S. at 513. 3 It amends the Internal Revenue Code and
references taxpayers and tax returns, requiring taxpayers to list information about their
health insurance coverage on their annual returns. See Pub. L. No. 111-148, §§ 1501(b),
1502 (amending the Internal Revenue Code to include 26 U.S.C. §§ 5000A, 6055). Any
amount due from the taxpayer under the provision is included with the taxpayer’s return
and thus paid into general revenues, along with any other tax that is due. See id. § 1502(b)
(adding 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(b)(2)). That Congress listed other revenue raising provisions
elsewhere in the ACA, see Pub. L. No. 111-148, Title IX, does not undermine the evident
tax focus of the Minimum Coverage Fee Provision itself.
3 Although Congress did not specifically invoke the tax power in support of the
minimum coverage provision, it did so with regard to the ACA as a whole. See H.R. Rep.
No. 111-443, pt. 1, at 543. In any event, the Court has not required such “express
articulat[ion]” for a legislative measure to be upheld as coming within a particular
congressional authority, stating in regard to Congress’s authority under § 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment that it is sufficient if the Court can “discern some legislative
purpose or factual predicate that supports the exercise of that power.” EEOC v. Wyoming,
460 U.S. 226, 243 n. 18 (1983). Here, the revenue raising impact of the minimum
coverage provision and its express references to the Internal Revenue Code and taxpayer
returns more than provide such a basis. In addition, that the provision refers to
imposition of a penalty rather than a tax does not preclude its being deemed a tax, as the
Court focuses on how a tax provision operates in practice, not how it is described. See
Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. at 779, 784 (determining that measure denominated a tax was
actually a criminal penalty).
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The legislative history also demonstrates that Congress understood the provision
to function in part as a tax. See H.R. Rep. No. 111-443, pt. 1, at 265 (referring to the
Minimum Coverage Fee Provision as imposing “[a] tax on individuals who opt not to
purchase health insurance”); see also J. Comm. on Taxation, 111th Cong., Technical
Explanation of the Revenue Provisions of the “Reconciliation Act of 2010,” As Amended,
in Combination with the “Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act” (Mar. 21, 2010)
(including Minimum Coverage Fee Provision in its explanation of the revenue provisions
of the ACA in combination with the Reconciliation Act).
To be sure, the Minimum Coverage Fee Provision also serves a regulatory
purpose in encouraging individuals to purchase health insurance. But the governing
precedents make plain that a regulatory purpose cannot disable a measure that raises
some revenue and on its face represents a tax. See Kahriger, 345 U.S. at 30-32; Sanchez,
340 U.S. at 44-45; Sonzinsky, 300 U.S. at 513-14; Doremus, 249 U.S. at 93; McCray, 195
U.S. at 59.
The Minimum Coverage Fee Provision is not a secret criminal penalty in disguise.
The amount of tax imposed is not disproportionate or a “heavy exaction.” Bailey, 259
U.S. at 36. It cannot exceed the national average premium for the lowest level of
qualified health plans for the taxpayer’s family size on the newly created health
exchanges and contains exemptions based on low income and inability to pay. See Pub.
L. No. 111-148, § 1501(b) (adding 26 U.S.C. §§ 5000A(c)(1), (2), 5000A(e)(1), (2)) (as
amended by Pub. L. No. 111-152, § 1002). The tax is in no way tied to criminal action,
and the Secretary of Treasury’s enforcement powers are strictly limited by statute so that
the government cannot bring a criminal prosecution or file a notice of federal tax lien to
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secure the government's interest in collecting the tax. See id. § 1501(b) (adding 26 U.S.C.
§5000A(g)(2)); cf. Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. at 780-83 (emphasizing high tax rate, deterrent
purpose, and criminal prohibition on underlying taxed activity in concluding tax
represented a criminal penalty).
Even if, contrary to our submission (see page 12, supra), the Lochner-era
decisions retain some vitality, they would not provide any basis for invalidating the tax
here. As just discussed, the Minimum Coverage Fee Provision is not a coercive
disproportionate levy, nor is it the sole basis on which the entire ACA is made
operative. Instead, the ACA’s detailed regulatory requirements are separately laid out and
are easily sustainable in their own right under Congress’s commerce and spending
powers. All that the fee provision requires is that those who forego health insurance, and
thereby impose costs on the federal government and on their fellow citizens, pay a tax.
The fee does not enforce any of the other elements of the ACA.
Just as the courts have consistently upheld the National Firearms Act against
claims that it was beyond the taxing power, see Sonzinsky, 300 U.S. at 514, so too here
the Minimum Coverage Fee Provision is well within the taxing power because its
requirements relating to minimum insurance “bear a ‘reasonable relation’ to the statute’s
taxing purpose.” Aiken, 974 F.2d at 448.
Third, the Minimum Coverage Fee Provision does not violate any fundamental
rights. No one has a right to be free from taxation, and Congress’s decision to target
individuals who decide to forego insurance is indisputably rational, given the impact of
their decision on the government and society as a whole. See Regan v. Taxation with
Representation, 461 U.S. 540, 547 (1983) (“Legislatures have especially broad latitude in
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creating classifications and distinctions in tax statutes.”). Since the New Deal the Court
has made clear that Congress and state legislatures may prevent individuals from
imposing costs on others through their economic activities. See West Coast Hotel Co. v.
Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 399-400 (1937) (emphasizing, in upholding minimum wage law
against due process challenge, that refusal to pay employees a living wage “casts a direct
burden for their support on the community” and “[t]he community is not bound to
provide what is in effect a subsidy for unconscionable employers”).
Plaintiffs may prefer a statute that imposed a general tax on all citizens to pay for
health care reform and then provided a deduction or tax credit for citizens who purchase
health insurance. But there is no difference for purposes of constitutional analysis
between that approach and the tax targeting only citizens who do not purchase health
insurance—both fall squarely within Congress’s taxing power. The choice of which type
of tax to enact is a policy determination left to the elected branches, not to the courts.
II. The Minimum Coverage Fee Provision Is Not a Direct Tax Subject to the
Constitutional Requirement of Apportionment.
The Minimum Coverage Provision is not among the narrow class of taxes subject
to the constitutional requirement of apportionment.
A. The Apportionment Requirement Has Been, And Should Continue To
Be, Construed Narrowly To Cover Only Capitation Taxes And Taxes
On Property.
Under Article I, Section 9, “[n]o Capitation, or other direct, Tax shall be laid,
unless in Proportion to the Census or Enumeration herein before directed to be taken.”
U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 4. The apportionment requirement is the direct result of a
compromise over slavery. Article I, Section 2 of the 1787 Constitution subjected
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representation in the House of Representatives and direct taxes to the same rule, which
counted slaves as three-fifths of a person:
Representatives and direct Taxes shall be apportioned among the several
States which may be included within this Union, according to their
respective Numbers, which shall be determined by adding to the whole
Number of free Persons, including those bound to Service for a Term of
Years, and excluding Indians not taxed, three fifths of all other Persons.
Id. art. I, § 2, cl. 3.
At the Constitutional Convention of 1787, the delegates generally favored
apportioning representation in the House according to each state’s population. But they
were deeply divided over whether and how to count slaves for these purposes. Some
southern delegates wanted slaves to be counted in full for representation purposes (thus
inflating southern states’ populations and, hence, their representation in the House) while
some northerners wanted to exclude slaves altogether. James Madison, Debates in the
Federal Convention of 1787, in 5 The Debates in the Several State Conventions on the
Adoption of the Federal Constitution, As Recommended by the General Convention at
Philadelphia in 1787, at 296-302 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 1881) (hereinafter 5 Elliot’s
Debates). A proposal was made to count slaves as three-fifths of a person, but at first it
did not attract consensus.
Then on July 12, Gouverneur Morris proposed that the same rule of
apportionment be extended to taxation as well. 5 Elliot’s Debates at 302.4 This “worked
as a compromise because the increased representation attributable to slaves came at a cost
to a state, an increased direct-tax liability for the state’s inhabitants.” Erik M. Jensen,
4 Morris’s initial proposal, like the initial proposal for representation, contemplated that
apportionment would be on the basis of wealth and population. 5 Elliot’s Debates at 302.
It was not until July 13 that the word “wealth” was struck, leaving population as the sole
basis. Id. at 309.
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The Taxing Power: A Reference Guide to the United States Constitution 27 (2005); see 5
Elliot’s Debates at 363 n.* (Madison observing in his notes on the Convention that “[t]he
object was to lessen the eagerness on one side for, and the opposition on the other to, the
share of representation claimed by the Southern States on account of the negroes”).
But the idea of apportioning all federal taxes in this manner provoked concerns at
the Convention that it might result in the same failed system of state-specific requisitions
that had proven inadequate under the Articles of Confederation. See 5 Elliot’s Debates at
302. “This criticism was regarded as a serious one, for no member manifested a desire to
restrict the taxing power in such a way as to cripple its effectiveness * * *.” Bullock,
supra, at 234. To address this concern, Morris immediately proposed “restraining the
[apportionment] rule to direct taxation. With regard to indirect taxes on exports and
imports, and on consumption, the rule would be inapplicable.” 5 Elliot’s Debates at 302.
That amendment was adopted, leading ultimately to the direct tax apportionment
requirement as it now appears in Article I.
The critical points from this very clear history are (1) the apportionment
requirement was extended to taxation only to help secure the compromise over the
treatment of slaves for purposes of representation, see Edwin R.A. Seligman, The Income
Tax 552 (1914) (“[T]he introduction of the words ‘direct taxes’ had no reference to any
dispute over tax matters, but was designed solely to solve the difficulty connected with
representation * * *.”); and (2) the apportionment requirement was limited to direct
taxation precisely to ensure it would not interfere substantially with the broad taxing
authority the framers intended to grant to the federal government, see Bullock, supra, at
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222 (the apportionment requirement was “not designed to injure * * * the taxing power of
the new government”).5
Recognizing these points, Justice Paterson made clear in the Supreme Court’s first
Direct Tax Clause case that, in light of its specific and narrow purposes, the rule of
apportionment for direct taxes “ought not to be extended by construction.” Hylton v.
United States, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 171, 178 (1796). Thus, although the precise meaning of
“direct tax” was obscure even at the Founding, the Court has consistently understood the
class of taxes subject to the apportionment requirement to be quite narrow. 6
5 During the Constitutional Convention, Rufus King of Massachusetts asked for “the
precise meaning of direct taxation,” but no one replied. 5 Elliot’s Debates at 451.
Contemporary scholarship reflects ongoing disagreement about the best understanding of
the Constitution’s treatment of direct taxes. See, e.g., Erik M. Jensen, The Apportionment
of “Direct Taxes”: Are Consumption Taxes Constitutional?, 97 Colum. L. Rev. 2334
(1997) (arguing that any tax not capable of being shifted or avoided is a direct tax subject
to apportionment); Bruce Ackerman, Taxation and the Constitution, 99 Colum. L. Rev. 1
(1999) (disagreeing with Jensen and arguing that the Thirteenth and Fourteenth
Amendments should be understood to have effectively repealed the apportionment
requirement); Joseph M. Dodge, What Federal Taxes Are Subject to the Rule of
Apportionment Under the Constitution? 11 J. Const’l L. 839, 842-83 (2009) (taking a
middle position in which “apportionment is still alive, but (apart from requisitions and
capitation taxes) is confined to federal taxes on real estate and personal property). None
of those accounts focuses on taxes of the sort at issue here, and none of them provides a
basis for treating the Minimum Coverage Fee Provision as a direct tax. And in any event,
as demonstrated in the balance of the brief, under the Supreme Court's cases the
Minimum Coverage Fee Provision clearly does not constitute a direct tax.
6 Justice Paterson also suggested that to the extent the taxation apportionment
requirement itself served any particular interest above and beyond the compromise over
representation, it too was confined to a narrow class of taxes properly deemed direct:
The provision was made in favor of the southern States. They possessed a
large number of slaves; they had extensive tracts of territory, thinly settled,
and not very productive. A majority of the states had but few slaves, and
several of them a limited territory, well settled, and in a high state of
cultivation. The southern states, if no provision had been introduced in the
Constitution, would have been wholly at the mercy of the other states.
Congress in such case, might tax slaves, at discretion or arbitrarily, and land
in every part of the Union after the same rate or measure: so much a head in
the first instance, and so much an acre in the second. To guard them against
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In Hylton, the Court held that a tax on carriages was not a direct tax. Writing
seriatim, the Justices suggested that only two kinds of taxes—capitation taxes and taxes
on land—clearly constituted direct taxes, and they expressed serious doubt that any other
types of taxes fell within that category. See 3 U.S. at 175 (opinion of Chase, J.) (“I am
inclined to think, but of this I do not give a judicial opinion, that the direct taxes
contemplated by the Constitution, are only two, to wit, a capitation, or poll tax, simply,
without regard to property, profession, or any other circumstance; and a tax on LAND. I
doubt whether a tax, by a general assessment of personal property, within the United
States, is included within the term direct tax.”); id. at 177 (opinion of Paterson, J.)
(“Whether direct taxes, in the sense of the Constitution, comprehend any other tax than a
capitation tax, and tax on land, is a questionable point.”); id. at 183 (opinion of Iredell, J.)
(“Perhaps a direct tax in the sense of the Constitution, can mean nothing but a tax on
something inseparably annexed to the soil * * *. A land or a poll tax may be considered
of this description.”).
For the century that followed, the Supreme Court adhered to the narrow view of
direct taxes favored by the Hylton Justices. Tracing its precedents since Hylton, the
Court in 1881 concluded that “direct taxes, within the meaning of the Constitution, are
only capitation taxes, as expressed in that instrument, and taxes on real estate.” Springer
v. United States, 102 U.S. 586, 602 (1881). Accordingly, the Court in the nineteenth
imposition in these particulars, was the reason of introducing the clause in
the Constitution, which directs that representatives and direct taxes shall be
apportioned among the states, according to their respective numbers.
Hylton, 3 U.S. at 177 (opinion of Paterson, J.). One indication of the protections the
Direct Tax Clause conferred is that after the Constitution’s ratification, “slaves were
taxed only as part of a general apportioned federal real estate tax. Without the
apportionment requirement, a selective tax on slaves would have been quite feasible.”
Dodge, supra, at 892.
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century sustained unapportioned taxes on a variety of forms of income and property on
the ground that they qualified as excises, including taxes on insurance premiums, Pacific
Ins. Co. v. Soule, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 433 (1869), state bank notes, Veazie Bank v. Fenno,
75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 533 (1869), inheritances, Scholey v. Rew, 90 U.S. (23 Wall.) 331 (1875),
and income, Springer, 102 U.S. at 586. See Bruce Ackerman, Taxation and the
Constitution, 99 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 25 (1999).
In Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co., 158 U.S. 601 (1895)—a case
subsequently overruled by the Sixteenth Amendment—the Supreme Court struck down
the federal income tax on the ground that it was an unapportioned direct tax. Pollock was
a departure from an unbroken string of decisions, yet even that case did not hold that all
income taxes are direct taxes—it was limited to taxes on income derived from real and
personal property. Pollock struck down the entire income tax because the absence of a
severance clause made it impossible save the other parts of the tax. See id. at 635-37;
Brushaber, 240 U.S. at 16-17.
Pollock was an aberration that did not produce any longstanding expansion in the
apportionment requirement. The Court immediately cut back on the decision, upholding
a wide range of unapportioned taxes. See Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S. 41 (1900)
(federal estate tax); Patton v. Brady, 184 U.S. 608 (1902) (tax on manufacturing of
tobacco); Thomas v. United States, 192 U.S. 363 (1904) (stamp tax on memorandum or
contracts of sale of stock certificates); Spreckels Sugar Ref. Co. v. McClain, 192 U.S. 397
(1904) (tax on sugar refining); Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U.S. 107, 177 (1911)
(corporate income tax).
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More significantly, the Nation responded to Pollock by adopting the Sixteenth
Amendment, providing that “Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes on
incomes, from whatever source derived, without apportionment among the several States,
and without regard to any census or enumeration.” U.S. Const. amend. XVI. As the
Court later explained, “the Amendment was drawn for the purpose of doing away for the
future with the principle upon which the Pollock Case was decided” by making clear that
all taxes on income are exempt from the apportionment requirement. Brushaber, 240 U.S.
at 18.7
Since the ratification of the Sixteenth Amendment, the Direct Tax Clause has
continued to be understood narrowly. In addition to capitation and land taxes, the Court
has stated that certain taxes upon personal property may also constitute direct taxes. The
Court has never invalidated a tax on the ground that it is an unapportioned capitation tax.
As for property taxes, the critical distinction between direct and indirect taxes on property
is that the former are imposed upon the “general ownership of property,” whereas a tax
on “a particular use of property or the exercise of a single power over property incidental
to ownership, is an excise which need not be apportioned.” Bromley v. McCaughn, 280
U.S. 124, 136 (1929). On the basis of that understanding, the Court has upheld a wide
range of unapportioned taxes on the ground that they are not imposed on property itself.
7 In Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920), the Court held that an unapportioned
tax on unrealized stock dividends was unconstitutional. But that case has been largely
confined to its facts. See Comm’r v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 431 (1955)
(suggesting that Macomber “was not meant to provide a touchstone to all future gross
income questions”); Union Elec. Co. v. United States, 363 F.3d 1292, 1302 n.11 (Fed. Cir.
2004) (“[I]n light of other Supreme Court decisions * * * upholding taxes on particular
property, Eisner v. Macomber must be viewed as invalidating only unapportioned taxes
on the particular broad class of property (corporate stock) involved in that case.”); see
also Michael J. Graetz, The Decline (and Fall?) of the Income Tax 285 (1997)
(describing Macomber as “now archaic”).
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See, e.g., Fernandez v. Wiener, 326 U.S. 340, 362 (1945) (upholding an estate tax
collected upon community property); Bromley, 280 U.S. at 138 (upholding a gift tax);
New York Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345 (1921) (upholding an estate tax); Stanton v.
Baltic Mining Co., 240 U.S. 103 (1916) (upholding a tax on the annual production of
mines); Billings v. United States, 232 U.S. 261 (1914) (upholding a tax on foreign built
yachts).
In sum, the Supreme Court’s cases embrace a consistently narrow understanding
of the taxes subject to the Direct Tax Clause. As the D.C. Circuit recently concluded,
“[o]nly three taxes are definitely known to be direct: (1) a capitation * * *, (2) a tax upon
real property, and (3) a tax upon personal property.” Murphy v. I.R.S., 493 F.3d 170, 181
(D.C. Cir. 2007). That is indeed as expansively as the Constitution’s reference to direct
taxes can plausibly be construed. Any broader construction would not only depart from
the Supreme Court’s cases and disregard Justice Paterson’s admonition “not to * * *
extend[] [the rule] by construction,” Hylton, 3 U.S. at 178, it could also jeopardize any
number of aspects of the current tax laws. Relying on the Court’s consistently narrow
understanding of what taxes are subject to apportionment, Congress has not apportioned a
tax law since 1861. See Jensen, supra, at 93. There is no call for potentially jeopardizing
the federal tax laws by expanding the sweep of the Direct Tax Clause beyond its
historical understanding.
B. The Minimum Coverage Fee Provision Is Not Subject To The
Apportionment Requirement.
The Minimum Coverage Fee Provision is not among the taxes covered by the
Direct Tax Clause, and is instead among the wide range of indirect taxes not subject to
the constitutional requirement of apportionment.
Case 3:10-cv-00188-HEH   Document 54-1    Filed 06/17/10   Page 31 of 34
25
The Minimum Coverage Fee Provision plainly is not a tax on the “general
ownership of property,” Bromley, 280 U.S. at 136, and thus is not the sort of property tax
covered by the Clause. Neither is it a capitation tax. As Story explained in his
Commentaries on the Constitution, “capitation taxes, or, as they are more commonly
called, poll taxes, [are] taxes upon the polls, heads, or persons, of the contributors.” Story,
supra, § 476. Such a tax is imposed on the person “without regard to property,
profession, or any other circumstance.” Hylton, 3 U.S. at 175 (opinion of Chase, J.). It is
a tax on a person “because of the person’s existence.” Joseph M. Dodge, What Federal
Taxes Are Subject to the Rule of Apportionment Under the Constitution? 11 J. Const’l L.
839, 841 (2009); see Black’s Law Dictionary 1222 (8th ed. 2005) (defining a poll tax or
capitation tax as “a fixed tax levied on each person within a jurisdiction”).8
The Supreme Court has never struck down a federal tax on the ground that it is
a capitation, and there is no basis for concluding that the Minimum Coverage Fee
Provision is the first such tax. Far from being imposed “without regard to * * * any * * *
circumstance,” Hylton, 3 U.S. at 175 (opinion of Chase, J.), it is instead based on a very
specific circumstance: the taxpayer’s failure to pay premiums into a qualified health care
plan in a given month. Taxpayers can easily remove themselves from the tax by
purchasing health insurance; this ability to exit the tax is not true of poll taxes or any
other capitation tax. The tax therefore is not imposed “because of the person’s
existence,” Dodge, supra, at 841; it is imposed because of the person’s decision not to
8 Although federal law imposes no capitation taxes, some states provide for them. The
Delaware Constitution, for example, provides that its “General Assembly shall provide
for levying and collecting a capitation tax from every citizen of the State of the age of
twenty-one years or upwards." Del. Const. art. VIII § 5.
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purchase insurance. The tax thus does not operate directly on any person or property, but
only indirectly as a function of the person’s particular actions. See Tyler v. United States,
281 U.S. 497, 502 (1930) (“A tax laid upon the happening of an event, as distinguished
from its tangible fruits, is an indirect tax * * *.”). As Justice Paterson said of indirect
taxes in Hylton, the individual by his particular actions “may be said to tax himself.” 3
U.S. at 180 (opinion of Paterson, J.). There is no precedent for treating such a tax as a
capitation under the Constitution.
Having concluded that the Minimum Coverage Fee Provision is not a capitation
or other direct tax, this Court need not identify precisely what kind of tax it is—whether
duty, impost, excise, or income.9 It suffices for purposes of the Direct Tax Clause that
the provision does not impose a tax that must be apportioned under the Constitution.
9 The Minimum Coverage Fee Provision could be deemed an income tax, in which case
the Sixteenth Amendment would immunize it from any apportionment requirement. The
tax for failing to purchase health insurance is calculated in part on the basis of the
taxpayer’s income, subject to certain caps. See Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1501(b) (adding
26 U.S.C. § 5000A(c)(1) & (2)) (as amended by Pub. L. No. 111-152, § 1002). It also
exempts some individuals from its requirements altogether if they satisfy criteria
establishing their inability to pay or if their household income is below the threshold for
filing a federal tax return. See id. (also adding 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(e)(1) & (2)). Thus,
any particular individual’s tax liability for failing to purchase health insurance depends in
part on his or her household income. See Brian Galle, Conditional Taxation and the
Constitutionality of Health Care Reform, 120 Yale L.J. Online 27, 31 (2010).
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CONCLUSION
The motion to dismiss should be granted.
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